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This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to
dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions
on motions to dismiss in securities class actions by district and appellate
courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases filed after the passage of
the Reform Act to the end of 2002. These circuits are the leading circuits
for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as rep-
resenting two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the
Second Circuit applies the least restrictive pleading standard to securities
claims and the Ninth Circuit applies the most restrictive. The Ninth Circuit's
post-PSLRA reputation as being a tougher venue in which to win securities
fraud class actions is borne out by a significantly higher dismissal rate. The
differences between the two circuits are also reflected in factors that cor-
relate with dismissal. For example, allegations of violations of accounting
principles other than revenue recognition correlate negatively with dis-
missal in the Second Circuit. This coefficient, however, is insignificant in
our regressions for the Ninth Circuit. Allegations of revenue recognition
violations are insignificant in both circuits, regardless of whether the issuer
has been forced to restate those revenues. The circuits part ways on other
factors as well: the Second Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss cases
*Address correspondence to Hillary Sale, University of Iowa College of Law, Melrose and
Byington, Iowa City, IA 52242; email: hillary-sale@uiowa.edu. A. C. Pritchard is Professor of Law,
University of Michigan; Hillary A. Sale is F. Arnold Daum Corporate Law Scholar and Profes-
sor of Law, University of Iowa.
This article was prepared for the Third Annual Joe B. Davis Law and Business Program
Conference at the Vanderbilt University School of Law. We are grateful to participants at that
conference, as well as Michael Bongiorno, Steve Choi, Jill Fisch, Marilyn Johnson, Don
Langevoort, Karen Nelson, Randall Thomas, Bob Thompson, and two anonymous referees for
comments on earlier drafts of this article. Melissa Williams provided invaluable assistance with
the statistical analysis. Jenness Parker, Matthew Rice, and Michael Russell assisted with data
collection.
126 Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
with allegations of false forward-looking statements, a surprising result given
the stringent standards for such statements imposed by the PSLRA. The
Ninth Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss complaints with allegations
of '33 Act violations, and the Second Circuit is more likely to dismiss cases
brought by the Milberg Weiss firm. When it comes to insider trading,
however, both circuits are skeptical, and the allegations correlate with dis-
missal in both circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
What counts as fraud in securities class actions? Who wins and who loses?
These questions are obviously important to the lawyers who specialize in this
area, as well as to the corporate officers and directors whose firms are tar-
geted by these suits. But the questions are also important to Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other policymakers and
academics considering the deterrence and governance roles played by secu-
rities fraud class actions.
To date, little rigorous empirical investigation has been brought to bear
on these questions. Most of the efforts to answer these questions analyze
appellate court cases or tally up numbers of lawsuits or settlement values.
Extrapolating from cases is the traditional mode of legal scholarship and it
can shed insights on many issues. Our study adds to those works by using
regression analysis to provide a more complete picture of how this litigation
works on the ground.
The dearth of solid empirical work on securities fraud class actions did
not chill legislative initiatives in this area in the 1990s. Despite the lack of
solid data on securities fraud class actions, Congress decided that the field
was ripe for reform. The initial lobbying force behind the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)1 was the accounting industry. Over
time, high-tech industry leaders, lawyers, and other frequent defendants of
such class actions joined forces with the accountants. 2 The concern voiced
most frequently by these interest groups was that frivolous class action com-
'Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
'See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the
PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 537, 555
(1998) (discussing reform movement and participants).
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plaints were being filed largely for settlement value.3 Reform proponents
claimed that a simple drop in a company's stock price would result in the
filing of a complaint that, in turn, would provide leverage for settlement
given the time and risk entailed in contesting such claims.4 Settlement pres-
sure also resulted from expensive discovery demands, and reform propo-
nents argued that nonmeritorious cases were settled simply to avoid the costs
of litigation.5
Although the evidence on these claims was decidedly mixed,6 Congress
generally accepted the arguments in adopting the PSLRA. The PSLRA erects
a series of procedural barriers to securities fraud cases intended to discour-
age meritless suits and reduce the cost of defending class actions. President
Clinton vetoed the legislation, expressing the view that it would deter mer-
itorious cases of fraud, but Congress overrode his veto.7
Congress's enactment of the PSLRA is simply the first step in the effort
to crack down on securities fraud class actions. Judicial interpretation and
application of the PSLRA's provisions will have much to do with how the law
affects issuers and investors. The process of interpretation is particularly
important for the PSLRA because Congress left its cornerstone provision
purposefully vague when it could not reach agreement on a more determi-
nate formulation.' Not surprisingly, that vagueness has led to divergent
interpretations of the PSLRA in the courts.9 Do those divergent interpreta-
tions lead to different outcomes?
To answer that question, this article examines how judges are imple-
menting the PSLRA's barriers to suit. Specifically, we study the resolution of
3Id. at 552-53.
4Id. at 553-54.
5Id.
6See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 903 n.57 (2000) (discussing and
citing articles debating arguments underlying the PSLRA).
7See 141 Cong. Rec. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
SSee Joseph A. Grundfest & A. C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627, 652-60 (2002)
(describing tacit "agreement to disagree" over the PSLRA's pleading standard).
9Id. at 667-75 (collecting cases).
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motions to dismiss under the PSLRA. The PSLRA makes the motion to
dismiss the main event for securities litigation. Until the motion to dismiss
is resolved, the PSLRA's discovery stay prevents the plaintiffs from obtaining
discovery to flesh out the allegations of their complaint. ° Thus, plaintiffs'
lawyers must construct their claims of fraud with, for example, the issuer's
past filings with the SEC, press releases, and witness interviews. Moreover,
the absence of discovery means that the expense of litigation will be man-
ageable for the defendants. If the defendants fail to get the case dismissed,
however, they must suffer through an expensive and time-consuming airing
of their potentially dirty laundry through the discovery process. Worse yet,
the defendants face the specter of potentially ruinous damages if the case
goes to trial (particularly for those cases that are strongest on the merits).
Both risk aversion and, of course, the possibility that fraud actually occurred
ensure that securities fraud class actions rarely go to ajury." Cases that are
not dismissed on a motion to dismiss or at summary judgment, and that
survive class certification, invariably settle. Understanding the determinants
of motions to dismiss, therefore, is a crucial piece in understanding how
securities fraud class actions operate in the real world.
We proceed as follows. Section II provides background on securities
fraud class actions and the objectives of the PSLRA. Section III develops a
series of hypotheses regarding the determinants of outcomes of motions to
dismiss in securities fraud class actions. Section IV presents the results of our
empirical tests of those hypotheses. Section V concludes.
Our findings reveal some similarities and some differences between the
two circuits. We find that the law matters-the Ninth Circuit's post-PSLRA
reputation as a tougher venue in which to win securities fraud class actions
is borne out by the data, which shows a significantly higher dismissal rate in
that circuit. Somewhat surprisingly, allegations of revenue recognition vio-
lations are insignificantly associated with dismissal in both circuits, regard-
less of whether the issuer has been forced to restate those revenues. The two
circuits take a similar approach to insider trading, which correlates with dis-
missal in both circuits.
'
0Exchange Act §21D(b) (3) (B), 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b) (3).
"Black et al. were able to find one securities case that went to trial in the last 10 years. Bernard
Black et al., Outside Director Liability, Working Paper No. 250, John M. Olin Program in Law
and Economics 33 (2003).
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The two circuits part ways, however, in their approach to other allega-
tions commonly found in securities fraud complaints. For example, allega-
tions of violations of accounting principles other than revenue recognition
correlate negatively with dismissal in the Second Circuit, but this coefficient
is insignificant in our regressions for the Ninth Circuit. The Second Circuit
is significantly less likely than the Ninth to dismiss cases with allegations of
false forward-looking statements, a surprising result given the stringent stan-
dards for such statements imposed by the PSLRA. We conclude that plain-
tiffs' lawyers are being more selective in making such allegations, in contrast
to less precisely targeted allegations tied to insider trading. In addition, we
find that the Ninth Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss complaints
with allegations of '33 Act violations than is the Second Circuit. However,
the Second Circuit is more likely than the Ninth Circuit to dismiss cases
brought by the Milberg Weiss firn.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT
The plaintiffs' and defense bar (along with outside observers) agree that the
PSLRA makes it more difficult to plead a securities fraud complaint that can
survive a motion to dismiss.12 The PSLRA addressed these cases in various
ways, including two that we focus on here: heightened-pleading standards
for securities fraud complaints and actual-knowledge standards for forward-
looking statements.
A. The Pleading Standard
The main focus of our study is the effect of the heightened-pleading stan-
dard. Most securities fraud class actions allege that the defendants violated
Section 10(b)13 and Rule lOb-5 4 of the Securities Exchange Act (10b-5
12Richard H. Walker, David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The New Securities Class Action:
Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 641 (1997).
'"15 U.S.C. §78j.
1417 C.ER. §240.10b-5 (1992).
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claims). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelde, the Supreme Court rejected a negli-
gence standard for 1Ob-5 claims, instead holding that plaintiffs alleging such
claims must prove that the defendants acted with scienter. 15 Scienter requires
that the defendant have acted at least recklessly in making the misstatement.
Thus, to state such a claim, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant made
a material misstatement or omission, with scienter, and that he or she was
injured by reliance on that misstatement or omission. 6
In their attempts to apply the scienter standard to complaints alleging
10b-5 claims, the circuits developed diverse pleading standards based on
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b) departs from
the general rule of notice pleading 17 by requiring that allegations of
fraud be made "with particularity," but allowing state of mind to be "averred
generally.""8 The two circuits we study, the Second and the Ninth, took
very different approaches to the pleading standard. Consistent with the lan-
guage of Rule 9(b), before the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit had developed a
heightened-pleading standard allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter generally,
but demanding particularity in alleging all other elements of securities
fraud.' 9
By contrast, the Second Circuit required plaintiffs to plead the state of
mind with particularity. Prior to the PSLRA, the Second Circuit had held
that plaintiffs could meet the scienter standard in one of two ways. First,
plaintiffs could plead that the defendants had the motive to commit fraud
and the opportunity to do so.2° Although simplistic allegations of motive that
could apply generally, such as keeping one's job,2' were insufficient to meet
15425 U.S. 185 (1976).
16Id. at 197.
17See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring that complaint provide only short and plain statement of
claim).
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
"See In re Glenfed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
'Goldman v. Belden, 754 F2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
21See In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D. Conn. 1994).
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the standard, other allegations of specific financial gain from a transaction
were sufficient to state a claim.22 Second, plaintiffs could meet the standard
with circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or conscious behavior.23
Generally, this standard required plaintiffs to plead contemporaneous facts,
conditions, or statements to show that the defendants knew or should have
known that the alleged misstatement was misleading when made. 4
In the PSLRA, Congress resolved this split by rejecting the Ninth
Circuit's approach and adopting a heightened-pleading standard that drew
on the Second Circuit's approach.25 The "strong inference" provision
requires that:
[i]n any private action arising under this tide in which the plaintiff may recover
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state
of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to
violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
26
Although it is now clear that plaintiffs must plead scienter with particular-
ity, it remains unclear how much detail is required to meet that particular-
ity standard. The legislative history can be fairly read to require a standard
equivalent to the then-existing Second Circuit standard or, potentially, a
higher standard still.2 7 The combination of confusing legislative history and
22See Goldman, 754 E2d at 1070 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that allegations that defendants' bullish
statements to market were connected to significant stock sales met motive and opportunity test).
2 See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 E3d 801
(2d Cir. 1996) (requiring plaintiffs seeking to meet recklessness standard to provide higher level
of detail than that required under motive and opportunity test).
24See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 E3d 1124, 1129 (2d. Cir. 1994) (rejecting allegations of
fraud where plaintiffs failed to contrast public disclosure with contemporaneous internal doc-
ument or data).
2 5See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1993), reprinted in 1995-96 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
26Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 746-47 (codified at Exchange Act §21D(b) (2),
15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b) (2)).
27See Sale, supra note 2; Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 8.
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the fact-based nature of securities fraud claims has resulted in different
pleading standards across the circuits.
28
Consequently, courts have struggled to apply the heightened-pleading
standard to various allegations of fraud. In this article, we examine the effect
of the PSLRA's heightened-pleading standard as applied to decisions resolv-
ing motions to dismiss by courts within the Second and Ninth Circuits. We
focus on these circuits for two reasons. First, these two circuits far outpace
the others in the number of securities fraud claims litigated.29 Second, the
two circuits have interpreted the pleading standard in divergent ways, with
the Ninth Circuit now recognized to have the most stringent pleading stan-
dard in the country, and the Second Circuit believed to have the least strin-
gent."0 These differing standards may lead to differing treatment of similar
types of allegations. 1
2S5ee Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 668-69.
'See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2003: A Year in Review 13
(2004) (reporting an average of 51 filings per year in the Ninth Circuit and 37 per year in the
Second Circuit from 1996 to 2003; the next highest circuit (the Eleventh) averaged only 20 per
year over the same period).
'°See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 671.
"A brief description of the conflicting standards may be useful to readers not familiar with this
debate. The Second Circuit relied on the legislative history and held that the PSLRA codified
its pre-PSLRA pleading approach. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2000). The Second
Circuit has, however, refined its explication of the standard post-PSLRA. Now, rather than a
two-prong test, the Second Circuit has set forth a list of the general types of allegations that will
meet the heightened-pleading standard for scienter. Synthesizing its own case law on the plead-
ing standard, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs can plead a strong inference of fraudulent
intent by including sufficient allegations that the defendants: received concrete, personal ben-
efits from the alleged fraud; participated in deliberately illegal behavior; knew or had access to
facts "suggesting" that the public statements were inaccurate; or "failed to check information
they had a duty to monitor." See id. at 311. This refined standard, of course, still leaves room
for pleading based on motive and opportunity.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the PSLRA repudiated that court's old
standard, which did not require that state of mind be pleaded with specificity. In interpreting
the "strong inference" provision, the court also relied on the PSLRA's legislative history,
but concluded that the statute raised the standard above that of the Second Circuit. See In re
Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). Under this higher-pleading
standard, the court rejected allegations based on motive and opportunity and on recklessness.
Id. Instead, to meet its new pleading standard for scienter, plaintiffs had to plead, "at
a minimum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or conscious
recklessness." Id.
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B. The Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
We also analyze the PSLRA provision creating a separate liability standard
for "forward-looking statements."32 This standard grew out of the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine developed by the courts. Under this doctrine, courts would
not hold defendants liable for financial projections and other forward-
looking statements if those statements were accompanied by cautionary lan-
guage to warn investors that the predictions might not bear out. If the
warnings were sufficiently tailored, courts applying the "bespeaks caution"
standard concluded that the forward-looking statements were immaterial
and, thus, not actionable, even if false.33
In the PSLRA, Congress created a liability standard for forward-looking
statements more restrictive than the standard for lOb-5 claims. Forward-
looking statements are now protected by a safe harbor. To circumvent that
safe harbor, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants making the state-
ments did so with actual knowledge of their falsity.34 Although the statute
does not speak directly to the pleading standard for these claims, it does
state that complaints must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."35
Further, even if the plaintiff successfully pleads actual knowledge, the statu-
tory safe harbor bars the claim if the alleged misstatement was accompanied
by meaningful cautionary language.36 As a result, courts often subject these
statements to more exacting scrutiny than other general allegations of mis-
leading statements or omissions
3 7
In adopting these reforms, Congress was attempting to reduce the lia-
bility exposure of defendants by making securities fraud cases more difficult
to litigate. Operationally, the PSLRA's principal barrier is making complaints
more difficult to plead. The success of any reform to the litigation process,
3 See Exchange Act §21E(c), 15 U.S.C. §78u-59(c).
33See, e.g., Kaufman v. Trump's Castle Funding, 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1993) (explicating
and applying "bespeaks caution" doctrine).
3 Exchange Act §21E(c) (1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1)(B).
35Exchange Act §21D(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. §78t-5(b) (2).
3Id.
3 7See Hockey v. Medheker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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however, will depend both on the work of the courts in implementing those
reforms and the responses of attorneys to those reforms. In the next section,
we develop our hypotheses regarding the effect of the PSLRA on the litiga-
tion and resolution of securities fraud class actions.
III. HYPOTHESES
In this section of the article, we develop a series of hypotheses concerning
the resolution of motions to dismiss in securities fraud class actions. We sort
our hypotheses into three categories. The objective of our first set of
hypotheses is to determine whether allegations commonly included in secu-
rities fraud complaints correlate with the outcomes of motions to dismiss
those complaints and, by inference, whether these allegations influence
judges who must decide these motions. How well do plaintiffs' attorneys
tailor their complaints to judges' expectations? The objective of our second
set of hypotheses is to determine whether variations in the applicable legal
standard lead to different outcomes. Thus, the first two sets of hypotheses
attempt to capture the impact of the heightened-pleading standard and the
heightened-liability standard for forward-looking statements on litigation.
Our third set of hypotheses focuses on whether the identity of the law firm
bringing the claims has an effect on the outcome.
A. Type of Allegations
As discussed above, Congress's stated purpose in enacting the PSLRA was to
discourage weak or frivolous securities fraud suits. The "strong inference"
pleading requirement discussed above is the key mechanism Congress
deployed. Earlier work studying the effects of the PSLRA has found that
plaintiffs' lawyers have attempted to satisfy this requirement by alleging that
defendants have violated accounting principles. 8
A typical allegation states that the firm and its managers ignored gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), provided numbers not sup-
ported by those principles, and thereby intentionally misled the investing
'PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000 Securities Litigation Study (2000), available at <www.10b5
com>; see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Reflections on Federalism: Securities
Fraud as Corporate Governance, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 101 (2003) (analyzing key allegations in
complaints filed in Second, Ninth, and Third Circuits).
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public. This type of allegation provides an intuitive basis from which to infer
scienter. Rules, after all, are meant to be followed; if they are not, a court
could conclude that the defendants were knowingly making misleading
statements about the firms' financial situation.
Allegations that the defendants inflated reported revenues may
provide particularly salient evidence of scienter, implying that the defen-
dants wanted the company's prospects to look better than they actually were.
The strength of these allegations is likely to vary with the evidence that
accounting principles have been violated. Restatements arguably offer par-
ticularly tangible evidence to judges of a misstatement by the company.
Courts may draw stronger inferences from alleged violations of GAAP if the
firm's auditors or the SEC have required it to restate its revenues. A restate-
ment will be required only if it is concluded that prior financial statements
were materially misleading, thus satisfying a central element for a lOb-5
claim. An allegation of an accounting violation without an accompanying
restatement may provide a weaker inference. Similarly, allegations that
defendants have violated accounting principles other than revenue recog-
nition may provide a still weaker basis for inferring fraudulent intent. This
analysis suggests a continuum of accounting allegations. Accordingly, we test
three separate hypotheses involving accounting violations.
HI: Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints with allegations that the firm has
restated revenues.
H2: Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints with allegations that the firm
has misled investors in recognizing revenues.
H3: Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints with allegations of violations
of GAAP other than revenue recognition.
Post-PSLRA complaints contain other types of common allegations,
though we believe the courts may perceive those allegations to be weaker than
accounting allegations. For example, the increased prevalence of option-
based compensation schemes in recent years has made it much easier to allege
claims using insider trading as the motive from which scienter can be inferred.
Moreover, the trades of officers and directors are publicly available, and there-
fore readily included in complaints. Such claims have in fact increased.39
"
9See Sale, supra note 6, 924-34 (collecting and analyzing opinions discussing insider trading
allegations).
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The theory behind these claims is that options, and stock ownership
in general, may provide an incentive for management to temporarily inflate
stock prices in order to liquidate its holdings. However, because stock and
option compensation has been so prevalent, it is also likely that there are
few cases in which insider trading cannot be alleged. As a result, if plaintiffs
do not exercise restraint in making such allegations, courts may discount
claims relying on insider trading as an indicator of scienter-despite the
intuitive plausibility of such conduct as a motive for fraud. Indeed, prior
work suggests that courts are highly skeptical of such allegations4 ° and that
the allegations are not correlated with abnormal insider trading.4' Accord-
ingly, our fourth hypothesis is that:
H4: Courts are more likely to dismiss complaints using insider trading to support the
scienter allegations.
Plaintiffs can also satisfy the scienter requirement with other allega-
tions of motive to commit fraud.4 2 An offering of securities by the corporate
defendant, either in the form of a public or private offering or a merger in
which stock is used as the consideration, is a commonly pleaded motive for
fraud.43 For example, the plaintiffs might allege that the defendants made a
misstatement to keep the stock price high in order to pursue or complete a
strategic combination, or that the defendants made a misstatement in order
to prime the market for their offering. Our fifth and sixth hypotheses are
that:
'Id. (showing increased rejection of insider trading claims and developing heuristics court
deploy in dismissal).
41Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, The Impact of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, Working Paper (Oct. 2004) (finding no association between measure of
abnormal insider trading and insider trading allegations).
42This is true in most circuits, including the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d
300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000). The Ninth Circuit, however, purports to reject
allegations of scienter based on "motive and opportunity." See In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig.,
183 F3d 970 (1999).
43See Sale, supra note 6, at 162 (discussing use of merger and offering allegations by plaintiffs
in complaints and judicial responses in motions to dismiss).
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H5: Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints when the issuer has offered securities
during the class period.
H6: Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints when the issuer is negotiating a merger
or has one pending during the class period.
B. Legal Standards
Differences in the substantive law that judges apply to the complaints
may also affect the likelihood of dismissal. Prior to the PSLRA, plaintiffs
based many claims on assertions that companies had released misleading
financial projections or other forward-looking statements.44 As discussed
above, the PSLRA raised the pleading requirement for all allegations, but
the statutory safe harbor raises the standard of proof, and arguably the
pleading standard, for claims based on forward-looking statements. 45 As a
consequence, courts may be particularly reluctant to allow allegations based
on forward-looking statements to survive a motion to dismiss, leading to our
seventh hypothesis.
H7: Courts are more likely to dismiss complaints based on forward-looking
statements.
The anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (which apply
only to public offerings of securities) differ substantially from Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act (which applies to fraud in connection with any pur-
chase or sale of securities). In particular, Section 11 of the Securities Act pro-
vides for strict liability for corporate issuers who have made a material
misstatement in a registration statement.46 Section 12(a) (2) provides a neg-
ligence claim for misstatements in a prospectus.4 7 Although plaintiffs must
jennifer Francis, Donna Philbrick & Katherine Schipper, Shareholder Litigation and Corpo-
rate Disclosures, 32J. Acct. Res. 137 (1994).
45Securities Act §27A, 15 U.S.C. §77z-2; Exchange Act §21E, 15 U.S.C. §78u-5.
4615 U.S.C. §77k.
4715 U.S.C. §771(a) (2).
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meet other hurdles to succeed with these claims,4" the PSLRA's increased
pleading standard for claims based on a particular state of mind was
included only in the amendments to the Exchange Act, not in the Securi-
ties Act.4 9 Nonetheless, some courts have held that when these Securities Act
claims are pleaded in the same complaint with a 10b-5 claim, the entire com-
plaint "sounds in fraud" and is subject to the heightened-pleading standard
of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0 As a result, those
courts have dismissed the Securities Act's strict liability and negligence
claims along with the lOb-5 claim. Others, however, have refused to adopt
this approach, holding that because the Securities Act claims do not require
scienter, they are not subject to a heightened-pleading standard and should
be allowed to proceed. Accordingly, our eighth hypothesis lacks a predicted
direction.
H8: Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints that include claims brought
under the Securities Act of 1933.
C. Identity of Counsel
Another factor that may influence outcomes on motions to dismiss is the
identity of class counsel. During the period of our study, Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach was by far the largest law firm specializing in secu-
rities fraud class actions, appearing as counsel in the majority of those suits.51
Bill Lerach, one of the firm's best-known partners, gained notoriety during
the PSLRA debates with his boast (repeatedly cited by proponents of
reform): "I have the greatest practice in the world. I have no clients." This
publicity is not likely to raise one's reputation with judges. Consequently,
48For a full explication of these claims and their litigation, see Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing
Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a) (2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 429
(2000).
4 9Compare Exchange Act §21D(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b) (2) (requiring complaints to "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind") with Securities Act §27, 15 U.S.C. §77z-1 (imposing no pleading
requirements).
'See, e.g. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2004).
5 1The firm has subsequently split in two, with the East and West Coast offices going their sepa-
rate ways. Bloomberg News, Millberg Weiss Becomes 2 Firms (May 4, 2004).
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judges familiar with the reputation of the Milberg Weiss firm may be skep-
tical of the claims that it brings, making complaints filed by that firm par-
ticularly susceptible to dismissal.
On the other hand, Milberg Weiss does more securities litigation than
any other plaintiffs' firm. Its economies of scale may make it the firm best
suited to adapt its pleadings and conform to or even anticipate shifts in the
case law.52 It may also have greater resources to invest in pre-complaint inves-
tigation, which might enhance its ability to plead with particularity. Conse-
quently, its complaints may be more likely to survive dismissal. We therefore
do not have a predicted direction for our ninth hypothesis.
H9: Courts are more/less likely to dismiss claims brought by Milberg Weiss.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We turn now to our empirical tests of the hypotheses developed in Section
III. We begin by describing our sample selection. We also present descrip-
tive statistics for the variables that we use to capture the effect of different
factors on litigation outcomes. We then discuss the results of our regression
analyses.
A. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits ruling on
motions to dismiss in securities fraud class actions. Using exhaustive searches
on Lexis and Westlaw, as well as various reporters and websites, we collected
every available decision (published or unpublished) by both district and
appellate courts applying the PSLRA to a motion to dismiss from the begin-
ning of 1996 through the end of 2002. Our searches yielded 213 total deci-
sions from these circuits. We then excluded all but the last available decision
in the sample for each lawsuit, leaving 155 decisions; 66 of these are from
the Second Circuit and 89 are from the Ninth. Of these, the circuit court
decided 9 of the cases from the Second Circuit and 11 for the Ninth Circuit;
the remainder of the decisions are from the district-court level.
52See ElliotJ. Weiss, Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 10-16 (2001) (ana-
lyzing the "creative drafting" of Milberg Weiss's Silicon Graphics complaint); id. at 27-44 (ana-
lyzing additional complaints by Milberg Weiss).
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We chose these two circuits for our study because they are the leading
circuits for the filing of securities class actions. In addition, they are gener-
ally recognized as falling at two ends of the pleading spectrum on secu-
rities claims. As discussed above, the courts have adopted very different
approaches to interpreting and applying the pleading provisions of the
PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the most stringent interpretation of
that provision in its Silicon Graphics decision, requiring plaintiffs to plead that
defendants were "deliberately reckless" in making the misstatements alleged
to be fraudulent." Not surprisingly, courts adopting higher standards appear
somewhat more likely to dismiss claims.54 In addition, the Ninth Circuit's
percentage of all securities class action filings has declined subsequent to
that decision, suggesting plaintiffs' lawyers prefer to litigate elsewhere. 5
Focusing on these two circuits allows us look more carefully at how the
different standards applied in the two circuits affect different kinds of
allegations.
We collected the data for each of the variables from the opinions
resolving the motions to dismiss or the complaints themselves. We restrict
our study to these data sources because the purpose of our analysis is to study
the judicial implementation of the PSLRA and the factors that influence
those judicial decisions. Thus, our study focuses on the cases as viewed by
the judge. Our variables abstract from the picture presented to the judges,
however, in that they do not capture the relative strength of the allegations
as they are found in the complaints. Allegations of insider trading may vary
in credibility, for example, depending on whether the insider trading alleged
is unusual in amount or timing. 6 This simplification is necessary to make
data collection tractable, but it excludes some data that could affect our
results.
5 In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
4Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 716-36. Stock prices in the high-tech sector rose after
the Silicon Graphics decision, possibly indicating that investors believed that the standard would
make it more difficult to sue these companies. Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A. C.
Pritchard, In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpreta-
tion of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading Standard, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 276
(2000).
55Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev.
913, 944-47.
56See Sale, supra note 6, at 926-31.
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It is also important to note that the revenue recognition variables are
coded according to the most serious allegation contained in the complaint.
So a complaint that includes an allegation that the firm restated its revenues
will be coded as 0 for the other revenue recognition category, even if the
complaint includes revenue recognition allegations other than the restate-
ment. By contrast, if a complaint contains an allegation that a company
improperly recognized revenues as well as violating other accounting prin-
ciples, it is coded as a 1 for both accounting categories. With these caveats
in mind, the variables are defined as set out in Table 1.
Table 2, Panel A shows the time-series distribution of the decisions by
circuit. Given that our sample consists of the last reported decision during
the sample period, there is a substantial lag from the time of the enactment
of the PSLRA for the decisions. Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statis-
tics for the entire sample, as well as both circuits, showing the percentage
of the sample having the coded outcome or allegation. Panel B also pres-
ents tests for differences between the two subsamples.
Table 1: Variables Defined
Predicted
Variable Definition Direction
Dismissed Coded 1 if the case is dismissed in its entirety, with or without
prejudice, and 0 if any of the allegations are not dismissed.
RestateRevRec Coded I if complaint alleges that the firm restated prior
revenues, 0 otherwise.
RevRec Coded I if the complaint alleges that the firm deceptively ?
recognized revenues, but without a restatement, 0 otherwise.
OtherGAAP Coded I if the complaint alleges violations of generally ?
accepted accounting principles other than revenue recognition,
0 otherwise.
InsTrade Coded 1 if the complaint alleges insider trading, 0 otherwise. +
Offering Coded I if the complaint alleges that the company offered
securities (debt or equity), 0 otherwise.
Merger Coded 1 if the complaint alleges that the company merged or -
was contemplating a merger, 0 otherwise.
FwdLooking Coded 1 if complaint includes an allegation of a false forward- +
looking statement, 0 otherwise.
'33 Act Coded 1 if complaint includes a claim for violations of Sections ?
11 or 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 0 otherwise.
Milberg Coded 1 if Milberg Weiss is class counsel, 0 otherwise. ?
9th Circuit Coded I for the Ninth Circuit, 0 for Second Circuit. +
142 Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Decisions by Year
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
2d 9th 2d 9th 2d 9th 2d 9th 2d 9th 2d 9th 2d 9th 2d 9th
Outcome
Dismissal 0 0 1 1 3 10 6 6 6 13 4 9 4 17 24 56
Denial 0 0 1 2 4 8 5 3 15 9 9 3 8 8 42 33
Panel B: Outcomes and Allegations
Variable Both (N = 155) 2d Cir (N = 66) 9th Cir (N = 89) Chi-Square (P Value)
Dismissed 52% 36% 63% 10.703 (0.001)
RestateRevRec 16% 17% 15% 0.123 (0.726)
RevRec 22% 18% 25% 0.946 (0.331)
OtherGAAP 32% 35% 30% 0.353 (0.552)
InsTrade 50% 38% 58% 6.401 (0.011)
Offering 28% 42% 18% 11.141 (0.001)
Merger 34% 33% 35% 0.038 (0.846)
FwdLooking 42% 32% 49% 4.832 (0.028)
'33 Act 17% 27% 10% 7.758 (0.005)
Milberg 59% 44% 70% 10.344 (0.001)
9th Circuit 57%
NOTE: Significant differences (at the 5 percent level) are in bold.
The most striking difference in Table 2 is the great discrepancy in per-
centage of motions granted. The Second Circuit courts granted 36 percent
of motions to dismiss; the Ninth Circuit courts granted 63 percent.57 The dif-
ference is strongly significant. This statistic provides some support for the
view that the Ninth Circuit is a tougher forum in which to bring securities
fraud class actions. This raw measure does not control, however, for the
content of complaints. It is possible (although not readily explainable) that
plaintiffs' lawyers bring systematically weaker claims in the Ninth Circuit.58
57The circuit court decisions are roughly consistent with these overall numbers in the Second
Circuit, with the Second Circuit granting dismissal in three out of nine cases. In the Ninth
Circuit, however, the appellate court granted dismissal in 10 out of 11 cases.
"
8Given these results and the broad venue provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act, one might expect plaintiffs to file suits in the Second Circuit, rather than the Ninth.
See 15 U.S.C. §§77v(a), 78aa. However, unlike general litigation, where courts give deference
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Consistent with the results of prior work, we find that accounting vio-
lations are common allegations in the complaints in our sample. Revenue
recognition allegations appear in 38 percent of the complaints, and allega-
tions of violations of other accounting principles appear in nearly a third.
There is no statistically significant difference between the two circuits for
any of the accounting allegation variables.
Insider trading allegations, however, are different. Allegations of
insider trading are significantly more likely to appear in Ninth Circuit com-
plaints, likely reflecting the importance of options as a form of compensa-
tion in the high-tech sector.
The other allegations vary. Offering appears significantly more often in
Second Circuit complaints, reflecting New York's preeminence as an invest-
ment banking center. Merger appears in about a third of the complaints in
each circuit. Forward-looking statements are more likely to be alleged in Ninth
Circuit complaints, and the Milberg firm is more prominently represented in
that circuit, appearing in more than two-thirds of the cases there. 9 The
to the plaintiffs choice of forum, in class actions and representative litigation like the securi-
ties suits studied here, courts give considerably less weight to that choice. See, e.g., Eades v.
Boston Tech., 1996 WL 668403, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1996) (collecting and citing cases).
Instead, the key factor is access to sources of proof, like documents and witnesses. See id. at *5.
In securities fraud class actions, it is common for defendants to seek to transfer the matter out
of a district where the "only connection with the litigation [is] the residence of one or several
plaintiffs, to the district containing the corporation's home office, where many of the relevant
documents and witnesses are generally found in cases of this type." Bolton v. Tesoro Petroleum
Corp., 549 E Supp. 1312, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Kanbar v. U.S. Healthcare, 715 F Supp.
602 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (transferring securities fraud and other claims from New York to Pennsyl-
vania where relevant witnesses, records, and documents were located and allegedly fraudulent
conduct occurred).
In addition, according to a recent study of securities fraud complaints, most suits are filed in
the state where the issuer is headquartered. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Study
of 1999 Securities Fraud Complaints (2004) (copy on file with authors) (of 83 complaints filed
against U.S.-headquartered firms in the Ninth, Second, and Third Circuits in 1999, 88 percent
were filed in state of issuer's headquarters). Moreover, California was the headquarters for half
of the companies in the sample. Yet, California has only about 15 percent of the American
company headquarters. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859 n.164 (2003). However, in secu-
rities fraud litigation, companies in the high-technology industry are sued more often than
others and that is consistent with California-headquartered firms dominating the group in the
Thompson and Sale study and here. Id. at 891.
59Although at the time this article was written, Milberg Weiss had multiple offices, Bill Lerach
headed the firm's San Diego office.
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Second Circuit has a significantly higher percentage of '33 Act claims, which
appear in slightly less than a fifth of the cases overall.
B. Regression Results
We now turn to the results of our regression models. We use logistic regres-
sion analysis with the outcome of the motion to dismiss as our dependent
variable. The outcome is coded 1 if the case is dismissed in its entirety, with
or without prejudice, and 0 if any of the allegations are not dismissed. Con-
sequently, positive regression coefficients are correlated with dismissal and
negative coefficients correlate with motions that are denied. The regression
results are reported in Table 3.
Our first regression uses the entire sample and includes 9th Circuit as
an independent variable. We find a positive coefficient on this variable, sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level. These results are consistent with the view that
courts in the Ninth Circuit are more likely to dismiss claims. This correla-
tion between a tougher standard and an increased likelihood of dismissal
suggests that the legal standard does influence outcomes.
We caution, however, against reading too much into the positive coef-
ficient for 9th Circuit. If the strength of the allegations in the complaints
varies systematically between the two circuits, then it is possible that the
Ninth Circuit is not more demanding. The significant coefficient for 9th
Circuit does imply, however, that the two circuits may differ in how they treat
different types of allegations.'
Accordingly, we ran additional regressions using subsamples of the
decisions from each of the circuits in order to control for the possibility that
there were structural differences between the two circuits. To assess which
variables were affected by the difference between the two circuits, we also
ran an additional regression with the entire sample adding interaction vari-
ables to capture the interaction between our independent variables and the
circuit.
61
'Our results may understate the magnitude of this effect because many of our district
court opinions were decided before the Ninth Circuit adopted its stringent standard in
Silicon Graphics in July 1999, although the general trend was established in the district courts
before that decision. Our sample is therefore potentially biased against a finding of statistical
significance.
6 The coefficients for the other independent variables are not reported here as they are iden-
tical to the coefficients for the regression using the Second Circuit subsample.
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1. Type of Allegation
In the Second Circuit regression, the accounting variables RestateRevRec and
RevRec and OtherGAAP each have the predicted negative sign. The two
revenue recognition variables approach statistical significance at the 10
percent level and these coefficients might prove to be significant with a
larger sample size. OtherGAAPis statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
These results indicate that accounting allegations correlate with surviving a
motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit.
In the Ninth Circuit, by contrast, none of the accounting allegations
even approach statistical significance. In our pooled regression, however, we
find that the coefficients for our interaction variables are positive for all
three of the accounting variables, and significant at the 10 percent level for
the two revenue recognition variables. These results suggest that the Ninth
Circuit is more skeptical of such allegations than the Second Circuit and is
likely to grant a motion to dismiss even when these allegations are present.
The circuits are in accord, however, in their treatment of cases alleg-
ing trades by insiders. As predicted, we find positive and significant (at the
10 percent level for the Second Circuit, the 5 percent level for the Ninth
Circuit) coefficients for InsTrade. These coefficients support H4's contention
that courts are skeptical of the rather noisy signal provided by such trades.
Recall that these trades are pleaded in many complaints and that the pres-
ence of options as a form of pay is likely to increase trades by insiders and,
thereby, the possibility of including them in pleadings.
Our other variables intended to capture motive to engage in fraud,
Offeringand Merger are consistently insignificant. We can conclude little from
this result. It is possible that motive-based allegations like offerings, mergers,
and trades are not particularly persuasive to the courts (nor are they par-
ticularly unpersuasive, as insider trading appears to be) but a larger sample
size might show a different result.
2. Legal Standards
The coefficient on the FwdLooking variable is significant in the Second
Circuit and the combined sample, but with a negative coefficient, meaning
that the variable relates inversely to dismissal. Thus, the sign on the coeffi-
cient is the opposite of the direction that we predicted with H7.62 Rather
6 The Ninth Circuit coefficient for this variable is insignificant. We note, however, that the inter-
action variable for this coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting the Ninth Circuit is
more skeptical of such allegations.
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than applying a very rigorous standard to such allegations and rejecting
them, the Second Circuit appears to treat forward-looking statements in a
less defendant-friendly manner than we expected.
What explains this anomaly? There are at least two possibilities.
The first theory is that plaintiffs' lawyers, with the stringent standard
for forward-looking statements in mind, are selective in choosing forecasts
and predictions on which to base suits. When they allege such statements,
they have good information to support their contentions. The second
theory is that judges are skeptical of the high barrier represented by
the PSLRA's safe harbor for forward-looking statements and are there-
fore reluctant to vigorously enforce the safe harbor at the pleading
stage. Although we cannot resolve which theory better explains this
result, we consider the second less likely. After all, judges created the pre-
PSLRA "bespeaks caution" doctrine without any legislative prodding. The
PSLRA's safe harbor is simply an additional step in the development of that
doctrine.
Our last variable relating to the effect of legal standards on outcomes
is '33 Act. This coefficient is significant (at the 10 percent level) with the pre-
dicted negative, nondismissal, sign in the Ninth Circuit, but is insignificant
in the Second Circuit (with a positive sign), despite the greater prevalence
of such claims in that circuit. Thus, courts within the Ninth Circuit are less
likely to dismiss '33 Act claims than their Second Circuit counterparts. In
our regressions for the combined sample, the coefficient for the interaction
variable for 9th Circuit and '33 Act is significant and negative, further sup-
porting the proposition that the Ninth Circuit is more hospitable to such
claims. We conclude that our findings support the hypothesis that Securities
Act claims are more likely to be treated as nonfraud claims in the Ninth
Circuit and, therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss.
3. Identity of Counsel
Our final variable, Milberg, has a negative but insignificant coefficient in the
Ninth Circuit, but a positive and statistically significant (at the 10 percent
level) coefficient in the Second Circuit. Thus, these results indicate a cor-
relation between dismissal and the presence of the Milberg firm in the
Second Circuit. The interaction variable for 9th Circuit and Milberg is nega-
tive and significant (at the 10 percent level), suggesting either that Second
Circuit courts treat the firm's complaints with greater skepticism or that the
firm brings weaker complaints in that circuit.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The decision to file a lawsuit and the drafting of the complaint is an art, not
a science. The landscape of securities fraud litigation changed dramatically
in 1995 when Congress passed the PSLRA. That legislation overhauled many
of the procedural and pleading aspects of securities fraud class actions,
leaving the standards for making such claims highly uncertain. Notwith-
standing this uncertainty, our findings suggest that social science may be able
to offer insights to class action attorneys who are making filing decisions.
Our study of motion to dismiss opinions since the passage of the PSLRA also
suggests that the reforms have had an important impact on certain types of
allegations commonly found in securities fraud complaints.
The first key reform is the heightened-pleading standard. Although we
do not take a position here on which circuit, the Second or the Ninth, has
adopted the "correct" standard, the results of our regression analysis suggest
that the standard may make a difference in outcomes. The Ninth Circuit
declared its intent to adopt a standard more stringent than the Second
Circuit's, and plaintiffs are now more likely to see their cases dismissed in
that circuit.
However, the actual-knowledge standard required for forward-looking
statements does not appear as formidable in the courts as it might in the
statute books. Holding other allegations constant, complaints raising such
claims tend to survive. We speculate that this may be due to increasingly spe-
cific pleading by the plaintiffs, but our statistical analysis does not permit
us to say more. It is also possible that judges resist applying the actual-
knowledge requirement applies to pleadings as well as at trial.
One of the most interesting aspects of our study is how the heightened-
pleading standard plays out with respect to specific types of allegations. The
Second Circuit appears to find allegations of accounting violations more per-
suasive than does the Ninth Circuit. Of course, it is possible that complaints
brought in the Second Circuit have stronger evidence of accounting
wrongdoing.
The motive-based allegations find a mixed response in the courts.
Trades by insiders are unpersuasive in both circuits, and the merger and
offering coefficients are consistently insignificant. Finally, the Milberg Weiss
firm faces more of a struggle in courts within the Second Circuit than in the
Ninth. The difference in the firm's results between the two circuits may be
driven by intra-firm differences as much as variations in approach by the
courts.
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In conclusion, our findings make clear that the law does matter. To
date, the most significant obstacle to class actions is the heightened-
pleading standard, rather than the special forward-looking-statement stan-
dard. Our results also present interesting possibilities for future study. The
strongest regression results are those resulting from the application of the
heightened-pleading standard to allegations intended to show knowledge or
motive. Plaintiffs with accounting allegations are more likely to survive a
motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit; the Ninth Circuit appears more
skeptical of such claims. We would hypothesize that in the wake of Enron,
Worldcom, Adelphia, and other accounting scandals, those allegations will
continue to carry weight with the courts, and that attitudes in the Ninth
Circuit courts may shift. Given the media and academic focus on the role
options appeared to play in today's corporate governance scandals, it will be
interesting to see whether the courts will reconsider their apparently hostile
attitude toward claims alleging trades by insiders as a basis for scienter. Over
time, of course, plaintiffs' lawyers may also refine their use of such allega-
tions to mirror more closelyjudicial doctrine. Thus, the cases decided in the
next few years may reveal a shift in the courts' perspectives on what counts
as fraud.
